Michigan Law Review
Volume 99

Issue 6

2001

Where is My Body? Stanley Fish's Long Goodbye to Law
Richard Delgado
University of Colorado-Boulder

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Law and Philosophy Commons, Legal Writing and Research Commons, and the Public Law
and Legal Theory Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard Delgado, Where is My Body? Stanley Fish's Long Goodbye to Law, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1370 (2001).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol99/iss6/8

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

WHERE IS MY BODY?
STANLEY FISH'S LONG GOODBYE TO LAW
Richard Delgado*
By Stanley Fish. Cambridge,
Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press. 1999. Pp. vi,
328. $24.95.

THE TROUBLE WITH PRINCIPLE.

THE TROUBLE WITH PRINCIPLE

Stanley Fish,1 author of Doing What Comes Naturally,2 Is There a
Text in This Class?,3 There's No Such Thing as Free Speech, and It's a
Good Thing, Too,4 and other paradigm-shifting books, and who re
cently left law teaching for a position in university administration,5 has
written one last volume giving his colleagues in the profession he left
behind something to think about. In his previous work, Fish, who
taught English and law at Duke University, addressed central legal is
sues such as meaning, communication, and textual interpretation,
challenging such received wisdoms as that every text has a single, de
terminate meaning, or that a regime of free speech is the best guaran
tor of truth and democratic government.
In The Trouble with Principle, the celebrated iconoclast takes on
another of law's most basic premises, namely, that legal reasoning can
attain any measure of certainty greater than that with which the rea
soner began (pp. 3-4, 9-10, 43-45). The structure of most legal dis
course, Fish writes, is irreducibly rhetorical. Appeals to principle serve
only as covert argumentative strategies, and persons who begin an ar
gument by saying, "Let's be fair," or "We must be consistent," are
merely postponing the moment when they must put their cards on the
table and tell us the cash value of their current platitudes (p. 3).
* Jean Lindsley Professor of Law, University of Colorado-Boulder. J.D. 1974, Univer
sity of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall). - Ed.

1. Dean, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Illinois at Chicago.
2. STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE
PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989).
3. STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF
INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980).
4. STANLEY FISH, THERE'S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT'S A GOOD
THING, TOO (1994).
5. See Alison Schneider, Stanley Fish, as a College Dean, Makes a Big Splash and Spares
No Expense, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 4, 2000, at A16.
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This Review begins by smnmarizing The Trouble with Principle,
paying particular attention· to passages that· show' Fish at his anti
foundationalist best - sections on hate speech (pp. 75-150), affirma
tive action (pp. 4, 20-21 , 26-33, 310), academic freedom (pp. 34-45),
and religion (pp. 153-284). Because Fish's prose is elegant but his ar
gument demanding, I offer a metaphor,designed to help readers un
derstand Fish's insight.6 I then show that the defect Fish highlights is
part of a larger disconnection that afflicts legal discourse, looming up
not only when we discuss affirmative action, hate speech, and other
controversial public-law issues, but also when we try to fit ordinary
private-law rules into a coherent system.7 In short, Fish exposes only
part of a more general self-delusion running throughout our system of
legal thought. In a concluding section, I recommend a pragmatic, anti
normative approach, similar to Fish's, but applied more broadly, to
guard against thuggery operating under the guise of principle. Such an
approach, tied closely to our deeply held moral convictions, I argue,
can help us remember to support what we need to support, resist what
we need to resist, and avoid losing our way, like a proprioceptively
handicapped patient,8 in the "body of law."
I.

CATCHING A BIG ONE: FISH ON PRINCIPLE

Consider the controversy that broke out when civil rights activists
demanded that South Carolina stop flying the Confederate flag over
its statehouse on the ground that it insults African Americans by gra
tuitously recalling the evil regime of slavery.9 For their part, a number
of South Carolina citizens retorted that the flag has nothing to do with
slavery or white supremacy, but merely symbolizes regional pride and
tradition.10 They marshaled, in other words, the very same principles
- respect for history and the feelings of a social group - that blacks
and their supporters invoked to retire the flag.
Or, consider the controversy that broke out on January 17, 2000,
General Robert E. Lee's birthday, when an unknown person set fire to
a banner of the Confederate general in Richmond, Virginia.11 The
Sons of Confederate Veterans immediately demanded that the police

6. See infra Parts II-III.

7. See infra Part III.
8. See infra notes 45-59 and accompanying text (explaining and applying this metaphor).
9. See David Firestone, South Carolina Votes to Remove Confederate Flag from Dome,
N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2000, at Al6.
10. See id.

1 1 . See Craig Timberg, Group Calls Banner Burning a Crime, BOULDER (COLO.)
DAILY CAMERA, Jan. 19, 2000, at A-3.
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treat the torching as a hate crime.12 As with the first example, forces
on either side of the controversy cited the same principle - anti
bigotry - in support of their position.
Over the course of sixteen short but tightly woven chapters,
Stanley Fish documents how paying attention ·to the way language
works in controversies like these enables us to avoid ensnarement in
traps of our own - or our adversaries' - making. He shows how ar
guments from principle almost always conceal, in fact presuppose,
politics and self-interest. He explains how we can avoid having princi
ples we hold up on one occasion turned against us on another.
Consider a widely held principle of ethics: that one should keep
one's word. In an early passage, Fish mentions an episode from the
classic western movie The Wild Bunch, which features an outlaw gang
led by two grizzled veterans, played by William Holden and Ernest
Borgnine (pp. 1-2). At one point in the movie, the two characters are
sitting around discussing a one-time comrade-in-arms who has gone
straight and now rides at the head of a band of railroad enforcement
officers bent on bringing his former friends to justice. The Borgnine
character muses that he cannot believe their old friend changed sides
and wonders why he does not return to the gang, where the stakes are
higher and the life more exciting. The Holden character reminds
Borgnine that the turncoat undoubtedly gave his word to the railroad.
So what? Borgnine replies. It's not giving your word that is important
- it is whom you give your word to (pp. 1-2).
The exchange makes plain that Fish sides with the "contextualizer"
- the Borgnine character. Principles rarely guide us in the abstract;
only in their use. Always stated at such a high level of generality that a
speaker can use them to arrive at whatever conclusion he wants, their
very point, according to Fish, is to make discourse appear inevitable
and high-minded, when it is the social and political commitments of
the speaker that allow them to gain any purchase (e.g., pp. 3, 8-10, 4445, 1 15-17, 142-46). And, if we had the courage of our convictions, we
would do away with the overlay of appeals to principle that litter so
much of legal and social discourse and amount to little more than
noise.13
12. Id. As everyone knows, civil rights groups have been urging enactment of hate-crime
statutes that criminalize burning crosses and other acts that send messages of hate to minor
ity communities.
13. Pp. 142-43, 146 (urging that we make decisions "nakedly" - without dressing them
up in abstractions). To be sure, in other places Fish argues that we are quite unlikely to go
this far, and so ends up recommending that we argue principles for all they are worth. See
infra note 39 and accompanying text. Fish's suggestion is typical of anti-foundationalists
generally, who maintain that foundations, like theories and principles, give us nothing that
we did not have already, and that we can reason, understand, communicate, and have
knowledge perfectly well without them. See, e.g. , p. 14 ("(Y]ou are on your own . . . the re
sources you need are within you if . . . anywhere."); Stephen M. Feldman, The Supreme
Court in a Postmodern World: A Flying Elephant, 84 MINN. L. REV. 673, 676 (2000).
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Part I of Fish's book sets out the case against neutral principles, in
cluding their inability to appear in any guise "not hostage to [a] parti
san agenda."14 Imagine that someone says: "Let's be fair." Fine, but
what kind of fairness? Fairness of equality? Fairness of result? Fair
ness as merit? Fairness of equal opportunity? Taking into account dis
advantage? (pp. 2-3). Abstractions like fairness, reasonableness, and
mutual respect only gain content by proceeding "from the vantage
point of some currently unexamined assumptions about the way life is
or should be" (pp. 2-3). When someone begins an argument by in
voking a principle of some sort, we only learn where he is going a little
later, when we find out what he means by fairness or equality or due
process. "[T)hat someone is invoking neutral principles will give you
no clue as to where he is likely to come out until he actually arrives
there and reveals his substantive positions" (p . 8).
One cannot avoid, then, getting substantive and engaging in
frankly partisan, ends-based reasoning. Moral commitments are all we
really know; principles only help "partisan agents to attach an honor
ific vocabulary to their agendas" (p. 7). Throughout history, some of
the worst cruelty has been carried out in the name of principle eugenics,15 Manifest Destiny,16 converting souls to Catholicism.17 One
sometimes cannot avoid resorting to principle in making one's point.18
But one should do so for consciously acknowledged rhetorical reasons
- to advance one's cause, to provide a judge an excuse for ruling in
one's favor - while fully aware that one's opponent will be trying to
do the same thing.
By the same token, one should be wary of the many ways argu
ments from principle can serve ignoble ends. For example, Fish notes
that for conservatives, "the basic move is to tum historically saturated
situations into [ones] detached from any specific historical circum
stance and then conclude that a proposed policy either follows
from this carefully emptied context or is barred by it."19 Thus, when
.

14. Pp. 2-3. For Fish, this is their most serious drawback. The next most important is
that they hide what is really going on; bad things are done in their name.
15. That is, purification of the human race. See, e.g. , DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME
OF EUGENICS (1985).
16. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS JR.,
THOUGHT 142, 185, 233-80 (1990).

THE

AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL

17. On the Inquisition, see, e.g., id. at 85, 94, 155. On the North American version, see
JUAN PEREA, RICHARD DELGADO, ANGELA HARRIS & STEPHANIE WILDMAN, RACE AND
RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA 173-78 (2000) .
18. For example, courts often expect lawyers to recite cases (a type of principle) in sup
port of their position, and in close cases tolerate arguments based on public policy. See infra
note 41 and accompanying text.
19. P. 4; see also p. 43 (arguing that the ACLU style of thinking is often parroted by in
dividuals with definite goals - not free speech "but sales of pornography, maintenance of
lily-white construction crews, the disadvantaging of minority religions, and so on").
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Justice Brown in Plessy v. Ferguson approved a railroad's "separate
but equal" law that consigned blacks to certain designated cars, on the
disingenuous ground that it treated black and white passengers "the
same," he detached a rule or act from its historical meaning - indeed,
from any meaning at all.20 Any principle, Fish writes, even that of non
discrimination, arises in response to historical circumstances. In 1954,
society came to believe that discrimination is wrong;21 before that, it
did not. The principle, then, has no inherent meaning; that comes only
from the substantive issues with which it has been associated.
Left of center on most (not all) issues, Fish makes many of his
points in the first part, entitled "Politics All the Way Down," at the
expense of conservatives. For example, he points out that writers of
this persuasion are prone to decry current "circumstances," com
plaining that the country has gone to the dogs, liberals are running the
campuses, barbarians are at the gates, and they - the right - are the
brave defenders of value in a wilderness increasingly devoid of it (pp.
20-21). But at the same time, they insist that Hispanics and blacks
should rise above "circumstances," unaided by affirmative action or
special measures aimed at redressing past disadvantage.22 The same
crowd at one time draws attention to circumstances, and at another
dismisses their relevance.
Neutral principles not only provide feeble guidance, they disable
us from seeing differences that matter, such as those between pornog
raphy and Michelangelo, between oppression and the relief of it, be
tween advocacy of racial reform and Nazis marching in Skokie.23
("Nazism is an idea, after all, is it not?"). After Brown v. Board of
Education24 was decided, Herbert Wechsler wondered whether the
case was principled, since it seemed arbitrarily to trade the right of
blacks to associate. with whites for the right of whites not to associate
with blacks (p. 26). But equations like that one, Fish writes, empty de
sires of any historical content and equalize them when they are far
from morally equivalent (pp. 26-27). For example, a legal test that asks
whether a measure displays race-consciousness and, if so, mechani
cally strikes it down, "displaces history and morality."25 One that helps

20. P. 4; see also pp. 5-15 (questioning whether any policy can treat fairly and equally
groups with radically different histories and current situations).
21. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); pp. 4-7.
22. Pp. 29-33.
23. Pp. 21-27. That is, principles do not enable us to do what their proponents argue
they can: adjudicate impartially among competing views, desires, and interest groups. Pp. 2126.
24. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
25. Pp. 26-28. "This is the trouble with principles determined to be neutral: they operate
'
by sacrificing everything people care about to their own purity." P. 28. By investing too
much in these meaningless concepts - meaningless save any association they have with po-
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a disadvantaged group advance is a radically different one from one
that allows white males to sue to stop them.26 Neutral principles do not
tell us this - they cannot - but morality and history do.27 In a re
markable tour de force, Fish concludes an early chapter by critiquing
nine arguments, each impeccably principled, against affirmative ac
tion, showing that each collapses on examination, revealing the pov
erty and churlishness in the hearts of those who deploy them (pp. 2933).
Sections on multiculturalism (Chapter Four), hate speech (Chapter
Five), affirmative action (Chapter One), academic politics (Chapter
Two), and the Western canon (Chapter Three) drive home that
"[l]iberal neutrality does political work so well because it has assumed
the mantle of being above politic[s]" (p. 44), so that "if you don't like
the political work it is doing, you must labor to take the mantle away,
strip off the veneer of principle so that policies that wear the mask of
principle will be forced to identify themselves for what they are and
what they are not" (p. 44). Affirmative action, for example, is good or
bad, not because it violates or legitimates some principle. Reasonable
arguments may be made about it - Does it work? Does it stigmatize
its intended beneficiaries? - but these are the right ones to ask.
"[T]he debate is always between competing structures of exclusion"
(p. 44). Principles and abstractions have no independent moral force
"except as the rhetorical accompaniments of practices in search of
good public relations" (p. 45). Fish cautions his readers to beware of
moments when one's opponents "have a public relations machine so
good that it's killing you, for then you're going to have to stop and try
to take it apart" (p. 45).
But Fish is not only hard on conservatives. In the middle sections
of his book, he examines some items of faith dear to the left, including
multiculturalism, whose advocates, according to Fish, are rarely pre
pared to follow it to its logical conclusion. They quickly pull back
when one of the cultures they have been defending engages in some
thing they consider barbaric (such as female genital surgery or fatwahs

sitions that they have previously been connected with - we become bogged down, tricked
into inaction and complacency. See infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
26. Pp. 26-28, 79-82, 287. By allowing ourselves to be led off into a search for something
other than our substantive convictions, by claiming to rely on a higher force, we suffer a
"forced inability to make distinctions that would be perfectly clear to any well-informed
teenager." P. 43 (going on to cite as an example the difference between a lynching and a mi
nority set-aside).
27. Pp. 3, 4-7, 9, 12-14, 146, 242, 287, 293. When an argument is framed in a way that
"labels itself a higher morality [it ends up being] so high that, from its lofty perspective, we
are unable to see either the forest or the trees." P. 29; see also p. 14 (equating morality with
taking a stand).
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aimed at writers who challenge religious orthodoxy) or begin denying
the legitimacy of other cultures or religions.28
Chapter Five, entitled "The Rhetoric of Regret,"29 skewers a sec
ond liberal platitude, free speech, which Fish considers yet another
perverse manifestation of proceduralism. The American Civil Liber
ties Union, for example, imagines itself bravely standing up for Nazis
and other unpopular speakers, and rising above mere preference (pp.
78-79). Society is supposed to be even-handed as among speakers, pre
ferring none and disadvantaging none, not even ones voicing ideas we
justly despise (pp. 76-79). But as later chapters point out, every speech
act discriminates against ones left unsaid; every utterance aims at kill
ing another, countervailing one. That is what speech does; its very
conditions entail selection among points of view (pp. 93-94, 98, 12224). The idea of a perfectly free marketplace of ideas in which un
committed observers dispassionately sample and choose ideas, some
what in the manner of a diner selecting from a restaurant menu, is
conceptual nonsense.
The notion of pre-normative tolerance is not only impossible, the
argument that it is the cornerstone of Western democracy is demon
strably false. The United States fought World War II not because
Nazis were intolerant of free speech, but of Jews (pp. 83-85). If any
thing, "[I]t is the habit of framing everything in terms of principle that
makes people confused about what they really want and renders them
vulnerable to certain argumentative ploys" (pp. 88, 20-21). Speech is
always coercive. "You go to the trouble of asserting X because some
other persons have been asserting Y" (p. 93). One speaks not to en
courage others to speak but to change something in the world, to bind
others to one's point of view (p. 93). All speech is action; all free
speech defenders (even self-professed absolutists) admit exceptions
corresponding to that which they politically detest (p. 94).
The way to resolve most speech controversies is to consider one's
substantive commitments and apply ordinary common sense. For ex28. Pp. 56-59. This superficial, or "boutique," multiculturalism illustrates the shallow
ness of reducing everything to an abstract notion of individual rights. A boutique multicul
turalist respects another culture and takes an interest in it until he or she gets to the core or
substance of it. The multiculturalist does not embrace the substance of the religion, the part
those who follow it feel most strongly about, particularly if the religion denies the legitimacy
of other religions. This is so because the multiculturalist is caught up, not in human rights,
but in the capacity to exercise those rights. Fish further explores this problem in his discus
sion of academic freedom: "What you are is your capacity for speech, belief, and choice and
not what is believed and spoken and chosen, then you are obligated, as a mark of self respect
- since you define yourself by general capacities that belong equally to everyone - to re
spect the beliefs, utterances, and choices of others." This focus on capacity rather than sub
stance renders one, "morally thin." P. 41. In the end, multiculturalism turns out to be "an
incoherent concept that cannot be meaningfully affirmed or rejected." P. 66.
29. P. 75. The term comes from the ACLU's frequent soulful professions that it detests
Nazis, pornographers, and utterers of hate speech, but must defend them anyway, for the
sake of principle. Pp. 78-79.
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ample, what is the difference between having Marxists or bigots speak
on campus? Easy - Marxists are educationally useful, bigots are not
(p. 89). What is the difference between a law prohibiting demonstra
tors from harassing women seeking abortion counseling and a hunter's
rights bill that penalizes animal rights activists who approach hunters
with picket signs? Also easy - history discloses no great need to pro
tect hunters, but more than one thousand acts of violence at abortion
clinics made a protective bill for women going there necessary (p. 89).
What is the difference between early civil rights bills and recent race
conscious efforts to ease college admissions for blacks and Hispanics?
Nothing - the early bills were aimed not at producing a colorblind
society but at improving conditions for blacks, just as the current
measures are.30
Who is to decide speech controversies - judges, college presi
dents? Where does one draw the line? Sometimes the consequences of
not drawing the line are intolerable (pp. 91-92). As an example of a
case where the judiciary backed away from an opportunity to draw a
clear normative line, Fish gives the case of Skokie. Other examples
might be hate speech, pornography, and violent TV programming
aimed at young children. "[R]egulation [which draws lines] is a consti
tutive feature of social life, not a deformation of it" (p. 127). Speech
and censorship are inseparable. In the final pages of Part II, Fish turns
to the work of First Amendment theorists such as Robert Post,
Richard Abel, and Judith Butler, all of whom criticize the legal system
for invoking medieval formulas and would-be universalisms, but end
up either not going far enough or shrinking from their own conclu
sions and embracing some new universalism (pp. 126-42). Fish con
cludes by urging that we make decisions "nakedly" - by resort to
substantive visions of what is good and desirable, not from theory
purporting to have erased substance.31 If one's substantive convictions
already tell one what to do, why invoke an abstraction? Doing so just
invites the other side to invoke a countervailing one, so that the rest of
the conversation is framed in terms of bloodless entities, when the
situation (in the words of the title of one of Fish's chapters) is "fraught
with death."32

30. P. 89. By the law's logic, however, all these groups - Marxists and bigots, hunters
and abortion providers - stand on the same footing, smashed together by an overarching
principle, with the result that "in our own history, procedural justice has been contaminated
by the very value judgments it supposedly brackets." P. 75.
31. Pp. 67-71, 142-46, 149 (pointing out that many liberals see hate speech as a problem
of disrespectful communication, when it is in fact an evil to be confronted and extinguished).
32. Chapter 6 (pp. 93-114) (analyzing the Skokie case and the impossibility of free
speech). This maneuver often works: "In recent years, liberals have been discombobulated
when a practice they abhor is defended by invoking the same principle they had themselves
invoked in order to argue for a position they favor." P. 88.
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In Part III ("Reasons for the Devout"), Fish, somewhat surpris
ingly, takes up the cause of religion. Liberal reasoning always fails to
come to terms with that institution, in part because the devout be
liever places his values over "fairness,'' "dialog,'' and "tolerance of
other points of view," principles the liberal relies on to keep every
thing more or less in line (p. 208-09). For example, liberals would like
to rein in religiously motivated abortion protesters who hound women
at clinics (pp. 89, 297). But their arguments fall on deaf ears because
the protesters consider that they are protecting human life, the highest
principle of all (pp. 187, 209). Any principle the liberal holds up, such
as "dialog," or "consideration of other people's point of view," will
make little impression on the ardent believer, for that is the nature of
religious belief - to be intolerant of other systems (p. 297). Religion
is not like a graduate seminar, where every point of view is considered
on its own merits.33 "[T]here are no reasons you can give to the de
vout, not because they are the kind of people who don't listen to rea
son but because the reasons you might give can never be reasons for
them unless they convert to your faith or you . . . to theirs" (p. 209).
In short, religion, like "every discourse, even one filled with words
like 'fair' and 'impartial,' is an engine of exclusion and therefore a
means of coercion" (p. 223). The very way we frame controversies for example, as viewpoint censorship (in case one is disposed to grant
funding of some religious group) versus establishment of religion (if
one is negatively disposed) - determines the outcome (p. 228). "Lib
eralism's attempt to come to terms with illiberal energies . . . cannot
succeed without enacting the illiberalism it opposes" (p. 242). Fish
finds fault with contemporary writers such as Daniel Conkle (pp. 18788), Thomas Nagel (pp. 181-85), Amy Gutmann (pp. 65-70), Kent
Greenawalt (pp. 211-20), and Steven Smith (pp. 229-33), each of
whom attempts to come to terms with illiberal energies but ultimately
ends up reinscribing some version of current practice.34 He then turns
the usual wisdom on its head and argues that "[i]mmorality [affirma
tively] resides in the mantras of liberal theory - fairness, impartiality,
and mutual respect - all devices for painting the world various shades
of gray" (p. 242) and rendering us confused, ambivalent puppets ready
for takeover by determined adversaries or faceless bureaucrats.35

33. Pp. 40, 68, 297; see also p. 185 (positing .that recent writers are guilty of this confu
sion and, as a result, end up privileging one regime or another under the guise of some fa
vorite - usually high-sounding - principle).
34. Or, in short, liberalism - precisely that which strong religions want to topple and
resist.
35. Pp. 241-42; see also pp. 2, 43, 103, 310-12. On the critique of normativity as posing
some of the same dangers, see Richard Delgado, Norms and Normal Science: Toward a Cri
tique of Normativity in Legal Thought, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1991).
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Beliefs do change, Fish says, not by resort to arguments from prin
ciple, but by pointing out to the adversary that the consequences of his
or her belief conflict with something dear to him.36 Fish recounts the
experience of a devotee of human eugenics who heard a speech by a
leading white supremacist. Among other things, the speaker railed at
society's unwillingness to rid itself of misfits such as children born with
cleft palates (pp. 281-82). The listener, who had a child with cleft pal
ate of whom he was very fond, immediately reconsidered his position
- not as a result of any argument from principle, but rather upon
learning that his fellow travelers espoused something he could not
support because of something in his.life (pp. 282-83).
In a final section, entitled "Credo," Fish gives his readers a glim
mer of what he does believe.37 The list will come as no surprise:
antiracism, affirmative action, legal protection for the environment
and for historically disadvantaged groups such as gays and lesbians,
and toleration for radical or marginalized religions.38 In deciding how
to advance one's commitments, Fish recommends the approach known
as pragmatism: decide particular courses of action in light of current
and historical circumstances, including the probability of success, the
likelihood of backlash, and the range of options available.39 It is these
midlevel, local, and historical concerns - the very ones that argu
ments from principle claim to transcend - . that should guide us.40
Nothing is wrong with rhetoric and persuasion, Fish says, even in
cluding arguments from principle, if one thinks these will wound one's
adversary or give him pause. But in trying to decide, for ourselves,
what to do, where to throw our weight, we need more compelling ma
terial than that.
Thus, although Fish first suggests we abandon principle, he later
offers this more pragmatic approach (pp. 8, 44-45, 126-42). In the first
part of the book he suggests fairly explicitly that we jettison principle:
"What's a liberal to do? My answer is simply: forget about the princi
ple (and therefore stop being a liberal), which was never what you
were interested in the first place, and make an argument for the policy
on policy grounds, that is, on the grounds that you think it is good and
right" (p. 89). But the use of principle is not only an approved, but a
necessary move, so that Fish cheerfully acknowledges that his original
36. Pp. 301, 307-08; see also pp. 282-83.
37. Part IV (pp. 279-312). He believes that his beliefs rest on no foundation. Pp. 279-80.
"[B]elief is prior to rationality. " P. 284.
38. Pp. 285, 291, 310-12; see also pp. 148-49.
39. Pp. 293-308.
40. P. 312; see also p. 63 (approving a version of Charles Taylor's "inspired adhoccery ":
"What [I] mean is that the solutions to particular problems will be found by regarding each
situation-of-crisis as an opportunity for improvisation and not as an occasion for the applica
tion of rules and principles. . . . ").
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suggestion collapses "in the wake of formalism's failure - the failure
of the search for neutral principles - everything remains as it was" (p.
294). Ultimately, then, Fish's solution is to embrace the rhetorical
value of principle and exploit it for all its worth: "You are free to de
ploy it (or not) when the occasion suggests it would be good to do
so . . . . Since they won't commit you to acting in any particular way,
you can traffic in them without worrying that some bad residue will be
left on your skin" (p. 295). Fish comes full circle, yet at the end of our
journey we are better off: we no longer need to feel the internal con
flict that ensues from adhering to a certain principle in one situation
and arguing against it in another. Because we are no longer duped by
principles - understanding them for what they are and are not "[r]hetorics in long, short, and middle versions are already there for
the quarrying; and what's even better, using them in a moment of need
commits you to nothing, necessarily, in the next moment. After you
have gotten from one what you want, you can just put it back on the
shelf" (p. 296). Fish is offering awareness of the rhetorical power of
principle as a tool for effectively dealing with conservatives who use
liberal principles, but "repackaged and put in the service of the very
agenda [we] once fought" (p. 312). In short, pragmatism.
"[M]inds [including legal ones] are never open except [with respect
to] matters of indifference . . . . "41 Is this cynicism? No, only apt de
scription. Religion cannot be tolerant - that is a contradiction in
terms, a little like a veggie burger. Liberalism cannot deal sensibly
with affirmative action, hate speech, or academic freedom - it ends
up tying itself in knots.42 Near the end of his book, Fish addresses the
question many readers might be wondering about, namely, if principle
offers no safeguard against tyranny and raw power, what does? Fish
answers that the best weapon we have - aside from our own moral
convictions and well-honed rhetoric - is a constitutional structure
that includes separation of powers.43 This structure erects a barrier
against official oppression, namely a system of "checks and balances"
that divides government, assures slow change, and discourages spon
taneous action aimed at hurting small groups or the sorts of "conflicts
that tore English society apart in the seventeenth century" (p. 301).
"These virtues [depriving people and state actors of opportunities for
oppression] are the properties of the system, not of those who live un41. P. 289. In law, the question is "what will go " in this case or that - which courses of
action, which rulings, with be perceived as respectable and familiar ("We've seen this be
fore"). Lawyers' stock-in-trade is finding and putting forward "something people like us say
when issues like this come up" - in short precedent. Judging is rhetoric of a certain stylized,
conventional kind. Pp. 288-89; see also Feldman, supra note 13, at 692 (observing that the
public needs to believe that judges act on the basis of constitutional principles).
42. Pp. 63-66, 71, 79, 187. And, if it doesn't, its conservative enemies quickly accomplish
that through a series of standard moves.
43. P. 301; see also p. 306 (reiterating role of founding documents).
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der it. "44
After a brief excursion into the role of metaphor, this Review ex
amines whether Fish's faith in constitutional structure as a safeguard
against tyranny is warranted.
II. A METAPHOR FOR STANLEY FISH:
THE BODY OF LAW AS PROPRIOCEPTIVELY DERANGED

Fish's prose style is clean and lucid. But his argument is so intri
cate, demanding, and, at times, counterintuitive that many readers
may fail to grasp its full sweep.45 As an aid to the lost (or time
pressured) reader, consider the metaphor of the legal system as a pro
prioceptively damaged human body.
In recent years, legal commentators have called attention to the
way certain features of legal reasoning resemble patients who suffer a
type of neurological impairment, namely damage to the body's pro
prioceptive centers.46 For the reader unfamiliar with it, proprioception
is the name for the human faculty - a sort of sixth sense - that in
forms us about our bodily position and location of our limbs in rela
tion to each other.47 It tells us whether we are standing straight or
leaning forward, without having to look. Patients who lose this sense,
through injury or illness, feel disembodied.48 Unable to locate their

44. P. 306. Fish appears to recognize that deconstruction of principle, even if it makes
liberals feel better about adhering to one principle for one agenda and abandoning it the
next, does little for the disenfranchised suffering from, e.g., affirmative action's demise or
the law's toleration of hate speech. Merely showing that the sources of one's misery lies in
conservatives' better use of rhetoric is little solace. Thus, Fish recognizes that other safe
guards are needed and that they may be found, perhaps, in the structure of the Constitution.

45. Fish himself appears to recognize his own thesis's counterintuitive nature. See
Stanley Fish, Children and the First Amendment, 29 CONN. L. ·REV. 883, 891 (1997) (noting
that desires and principles are inversely related, not the way most people think). Desires
come first and last, and we carefully choose principles in between that will bridge them. In
stead of following our principles wherever they may lead, we "figure out what [we] think
should happen and then look around for principles, First Amendment or any other, that will
help [us] to get there." Id.
46. E.g. , Julia E. Hanigsberg, Homologizing Pregnancy and Motherhood: A Considera
tion of Abortion, 94 MICH. L. REV. 371, 382 n.50 (1995); Jeffrey Brand-Ballard, Recon
structing MacKinnon: Essentialism, Humanism, Feminism, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S
STUD. 89, 170 (1996); Lisa Fry, Finding the Body (unpublished, 1997, on file with author).
Proprioception is used to provide our internal body image - that is, the way (in addition to
visual stimuli) in which our brain receives information about the position of our body. Pro
prioceptors are sense organs buried deep in the tissues of muscles, tendons, and joints that
give rise to the sensations of weight, positions of the body, and the amount of bending in
various joints. When this system sustains an injury, one literally loses touch with one's body.
47. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1458-59 (Maureen Barlow Pugh et al. eds.,
27th ed. 1995).
48. See infra text accompanying notes 50-59.
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bodies in relation to themselves and to objects in the external world,
they describe themselves as bodiless or "pithed."49
In a chapter of his book, The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a
Hat,50 neurosurgeon Oliver Sacks describes a patient named Christina,
the "disembodied lady."51 Christina, who until that time had been a
robust, self-assured young woman who worked as a computer pro
grammer and liked hockey and riding, was admitted to the hospital for
a gallstone operation,52 On the day of the operation, perhaps as a reac
tion to routine antibiotic treatment, Christina had a disturbing dream,
in which she swayed wildly, could not feel the ground underneath her
self, and kept dropping things because she could hardly feel anything
in her hands.53 A psychiatrist diagnosed her as suffering from pre
operative anxiety ("we see it all the time"),54 but later that day
Christina's dream came true. She found herself unsteady on her feet,
in danger of toppling over, and could hold nothing in her hands, which
"wandered" unless she kept an eye on them.55 On testing, her parietal
lobes turned out to be working, but "had nothing to work with."56 She
had lost all proprioception and had no muscle, tendon, or neuroskele
tal sense whatever. Her position sense was entirely gone, never to re
turn.57
Christina is condemned to live in an indescribable, unimaginable realm
- though 'non-realm', and 'nothingness', might be ... better words for
it. At times she breaks down - not in public, but with me: 'If only I

feel!' she cries. 'But I've forgotten what it's like ... I was normal,
did move like everyone else?'58
Sacks took to showing Christina home movies of herself with her chil
dren, taken just before the onset of her condition, before she became
"pithed," "disembodied," "a sort of wraith."59
The plight of the proprioceptively impaired individual is similar to
the predicament Fish diagnoses in the person who approaches real
world problems by first asking what principle commands and ends up
could

wasn't I? I

49. See infra text accompanying notes 57-59.
50. OLIVER SACKS, THE MAN WHO MISTOOK HIS WIFE FOR A HAT, AND OTHER
CLINICAL TALES (1985).
51. Id. at 42-52 (ch. 3, "The Disembodied Lady").
52. See id. at 43.
53. See id. at 43-44.
54. Id. at 44.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 45.
57. See id. at 45-52 (describing how she recovered some of her ability to function by
learning to examine herself closely every few seconds).
·

58. Id. at 50.
59. Id. at 44, 50, 52.
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paralyzed, disconnected from the very sources of information that
could tell him or her what to do (pp. 20-21, 67-71, 88, 142-49, 241-42).
In some respects, his fate is even worse than that of Christina, who
only needed to open her eyes to see where her hands were.60 One who
puts his faith in principle sees an infinitude of hands, with little way of
telling which are his own. Like a pithed patient, he is doomed to in
habit a body of law filled with myriad, often contradictory, principles,
each with a seemingly equal claim to his allegiance and pointing in dif
ferent directions.61
When Fish writes that substantive commitments are more impor
tant than neutral principles, when social scientists point out that high
scores on the Graduate Record Exam are negatively correlated with
social empathy,62 and when a recent book documents that higher levels
of education were inversely related rescue behavior toward Jews dur
ing the Holocaust,63 he is highlighting different aspects of the same
60. See id. at 46-49.
61. See supra notes 30, 32, 34 and accompanying text. Like the patient whose proprio
ception is compromised, legal thinkers can go through their professional lives slightly (or in
some cases, greatly) "out of touch," but unable to quite put their fingers on why. Like the
patient, their sense of self is skewed, their positional senses dictated by principles that, rather
than being full of meaning and, therefore, providing some semblance of guidance, are liter
ally empty - waiting to be spewed to fit any agenda, waiting to be filled in the blank to jus
tify whichever outcome is sought. The contradictory results that Fish cites - restrictions on
affirmative action, protecting speech that ends up suppressing other voices, the hypocrisy of
academic freedom, our schizophrenic view of religion - are each a result of this artificial
guidance system. See Jack M. Balkin, The Court Defers to a Racist Era, N. Y. TIMES, May 17,
2000, at A23 (noting that the Supreme Court and Congress view much of civil rights legisla
tion as based on the Interstate Commerce Clause, when a more natural home would be the
Fourteenth Amendment). Just as Sacks's Christina "consciously or automatically adopted
and sustained a sort of forced or wilful or histrionic posture to make up for the continuing
lack of any genuine, natural posture," SACKS, supra note 50, at 48, by relying on a flawed
guidance system, the legal actor backs into awkward, inauthentic results.
Who, then, will be the neurologist for our society? We will have to dismantle our rheto
ric, suggests Fish, and realize that to hide behind principle is like kicking someone under
neath a glass table - you are fooling no one. When we step away from the constraints of
principle, we will walk straight again. For example, when we step back from the notion of a
colorblind Constitution we will recognize that it does make a difference if the active party is
the KKK or the NAACP. Similarly, when we are free from the clutches of a lofty but empty
notion of individual rights we will see that a Shakespearean sonnet and hard-core pornogra
phy are distinct. By recognizing that one cannot have a procedural mechanism that is not
hostage to judgments of substance, one will no longer be forced to defend speech acts one
despises, or brush one's values aside for the sake of procedural purity. Pp. 2, 75, 117.
62. The exam measures ability to reason abstractly, i.e., from principle. This ability often
correlates incorrectly with social empathy. See Leonard L. Baird, Biographical and Educa
tional Correlates of Graduate and Professional School Admissions Test Scores, 36 EDUC. &
PSYCHOL. MEASUREMENT 415, 417-18 tbl. 1 (1976). The same author found that LSAT
scores correlate negatively with the ability to relate to others on an individual basis. Id. at
419. They do, however, correlate positively with a self-oriented, hedonistic personality. See
ALEXANDER w. ASTIN, WHAT MATTERS IN COLLEGE 213 (1993). For a discussion of the
different types of mental ability, see DANIEL GOLEMAN, WORKING WITH EMOTIONAL
INTELLIGENCE (1998).
63. SAMUEL P. OLINER & PEARL M. OLINER, THE ALTRUISTIC PERSONALITY:
RESCUERS OF JEWS IN NAZI EUROPE (1988).
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phenomenon: abstraction and principle cause human beings to behave
like decerebrates and to display less, rather than more, intelligence in
ordering their own affairs. 64 "This [then,] is the trouble with princi
ples . . . they operate by sacrificing everything people care about to
their own purity. [They] become[ ] 'an end in itself' that blithely disre
gard[ ] any other value." 65
Fish is right about the unreliability of principle and also about
what we should depend on in our personal lives, instead. But what of
his suggestion that, with law and politics, we look not to principle, but
to the structure of our Constitution, including separation of powers,
for guidance? Unfortunately, that feature turns out to offer no more
protection than does our current fascination with principle.
III.

DISCONNECT- How OUR SYSTEM OF PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE LAW OPERATES AT CROSS-PURPOSES

According to Fish, we should abjure principle as a guide to per
sonal action and look instead to two other sources - our own moral
commitments, in the personal realm, 66 and the principle of separation
of powers, which assures that governmental authority is weakened and
subject to constant checks and balances, including popular will, in the
political one. 67 Nothing is wrong with relying on one's own substantive
moral commitments. But with his second prescription, Fish falls into
the same proceduralist trap he warns against elsewhere. Government
has even fewer scruples than individual actors do; indeed, the hope
that it will restrain itself for reasons of morality is probably the most
classic category mistake of all. 68 Even more than individual actors,
governments have readily accessible a panoply of principles - sover
eignty, national interest, free trade, manifest destiny, even human
rights - to rationalize what they really want to do. 69
Fish believes that, even if government is inclined to act badly, our
constitutional principles of limited government, separation of powers,
and checks and balances, will guard against overreaching (p. 301). But
consider how readily government can find ways around these limiting
principles. Congress is supposed to be the only branch of government
able to declare war.70 Yet, the president is the commander-in-chief of
64. See Delgado, supra note 35, at 938-59.
65. P. 28 (quoting Charles Krauthammer); see also Delgado, supra note 35.
66. Pp. 2, 7-8, 43, 93-114, 242-43, 310-12; see also supra note 39 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
68. By the term "category mistake, " I mean the practice of attributing meaning or effi
cacy to a category or thing that cannot have it (e.g., What is the flavor of yellow?).
&

69. See, e.g., NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE AND THE DISCOURSES (Luigi Ricci
E.R.P. Vincent transl., Random House, 1950) (1513).
70. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 11.
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the armed forces.71 Since he is able to deploy troops practically at will,
it is easy for the president to circumvent Congress's authority; indeed,
most recent wars have been undeclared.72
Or, consider the Plenary Power doctrine, under which the judiciary
declines to review matters having to do with immigration, even ones
presenting clear-cut equal protection issues,73 or the myriad of related
doctrines, including abstention,74 mootness,75 and political questions76
that enable judges to avoid deciding issues. that might require politi
cally sensitive interference with another branch of government.77
Well-funded interest groups and corporations are able to ensure
that all three branches of government favor policies they want ad
vanced,78 rendering chimerical the hope that any one of them will act
as a real check against another in an area vitally affecting the interests
of corporate power or the military. When powerful interest groups
need immediate action, they increasingly short-circuit the political
process by financing referenda and initiative campaigns that mobilize
the public on behalf of tax-cutting, nativist, or antiminority measures.79
Finally, the very structure of our system of public and private law
suffers from such a major disjunction, traceable to our founding
documents, that adroit invocation of a high-sounding principle will
generally allow one to reach any desired result. This is worth explain
ing in some detail.
The large ideas underlying American public law - administrative
regularity, the equality of all moral agents, one-man one vote, due
process/dignity of treatment, dialog/free speech - have always stood
in tension with those that govern private law - free accumulation of
71. Id., art. II, § 2, cl. 1 .
72. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 4-7 a t 231 (2d ed.
1988).
.
73. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN, AND HIROSHI
MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 268-70, 925-85 (4th
ed. 1998); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990).
74. See TRIBE, supra note 72, §§ 3-22 to -30.
75. See id. §§ 3-11 .
76. See id. §§ 3-13, 4-16 at 285.
77. In the service of conservative ends, the current Court seems quite willing to employ
principle, such as a newly limited view of the reach of the Commerce Clause, to reign in
Congress's power to regulate. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 527 U.S. 898 (1997); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
78. See, e.g., JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD DELGADO, No MERCY: How
CONSERVATIVE THINK TANKS AND FOUNDATIONS CHANGED AMERICA'S SOCIAL
AGENDA (1996); Alexander Wohl, Justice for Rent: The Scandal of Judicial Campaign Fi
nancing, AM. PROSPECT, May 22, 2000, at 34; Molly Ivins, Secret Donors Can Buy Elections,
BOULDER (COLO. ) DAILY CAMERA, June 13, 2000, at lOA.
79. See PETER SCHRAG, PARADISE LOST: CALIFORNIA'S EXPERIENCE, AMERICA'S
FuTURE 139-55, 229-56 (1998), on the way initiative campaigns have transformed California.
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wealth, liberty of contract, employment at will, stability of expecta
tions, protection of private property, and the right to leave it all to
your children, even if they are no good.80 This hybrid, which promises
radical democracy in our public sphere, and individualistic free market
capitalism in the private one, today, even more than formerly, is on a
collision course with itself. Until recently, the public side has always
managed to counter some of the excesses of aggressive capitalism by
assuring that at least a few members of the working class would rise
and assume places in government, academia, and the professions.81
But now, globalism and the advent of an economy based on com
puters and information are concentrating capital so rapidly in the
hands of a small elite that the uneasy truce that allowed the two
headed system to work is beginning to break down.82 Already the most
economically stratified society in the industrialized world, the United
States is increasingly taking on the appearance and structure of an oli
garchy.83 Moreover, the high costs of political campaigns and TV ads
guarantee government by the wealthy into the foreseeable future.84
Formerly, public education served as an avenue of upward mobil
ity, enabling an occasional poor but bright child to rise. Functioning as
a conduit between the private sector � the realm of self-interest and the public spheres of government, higher education, and the me
dia, free schooling closed some of the gap between the private and the
public, enabling a few from the lower economic strata, or their chil
dren, to move up.85 It allowed us to believe that democracy and capi
talism were compatible. But now that avenue is narrowing as conser
vatives realize that today's economy does not need large numbers of

80. See, e.g., KARL MARX, ON THE JEWISH QUESTION (Ellis Rivkin ed. & Helen
Lederer transl., Hebrew Union Coll. - Jewish Inst. Of Religion, 1958) (commenting on this
paradox).
81. That is, the gap between the ostensibly egalitarian focus of the public law, and the
selfish, individualistic thrust of private law, has been justified by the supposed ability of any
one, regardless of his or her initial economic position, to rise and gain access to the public
sphere by dint of hard work. See, e.g. , NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE BIG TEST 24-29, 67-78
(1999); David Broder, Democracy Derailed, SUNDAY DAILY CAMERA (Boulder, Colo.),
Apr. 20, 2000, at El.
82. See, e.g. , Holly Sklar et al., The Growing Wealth Gap, Z MAG., May 1999, at 47. De
crying gross inequity as dangerous to democracy, see Jack H. Balkin, The Declaration and
the Promise ofa Democratic Culture, 4 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 167 (1999).
83. See Sklar et al., supra note 82; Holly Sklar, Brother, Can You Spare a Billion? Z
MAG., Dec. 1999, at 23; Roger C. Altman, Editorial, 'The Fourth World: On a Global Scale,
Technology Has Created a Huge Gap Between the 'Haves' and the 'Have-Nots,' L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 1999, at Ml.
84. See Symposium, Campaign Finance as a Civil Rights Issue, 43 HOWARD L.J. 1
(1999); Molly Ivins, Soon the Word 'Politics' Will Mean 'Money,' BOULDER (COLO.) DAILY
CAMERA, Mar. 8, 2000, at 9A.
85. See LEMANN, supra note 81, at 24-29, 67-78.
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unskilled or semiskilled workers.86 What manufacturing that is neces
sary is done more cheaply by moving factories to the Third World,
where the cost of labor is lower,87 while public education can be con
ducted more cheaply by emphasizing tests,88 attacking teachers' un
ions,89 and offering the illusion of choice through charter schools and
vouchers.90
At the same time, Congress has been slow to reform elections, ei
ther by financing campaigns so that poor but talented candidates have
a chance of winning,91 or by adopting redistricting or voting changes
aimed at improving the chances of minority and blue-collar candi
dates.92 This inattention to school funding and election reform places
enough barriers in the way of the poor that the chances of an inner
city child growing up to be president of the United States seem virtu
ally nil.
Our public and private systems of law do contain devices to control
distortions of various types - but generally only within each system.
Our public law contains strict scrutiny, in which courts examine skep
tically any restraint on the exercise of a basic (usually political) right,
such as speech or association93 or the rights of minority groups.94 It
also prohibits gross political misbehavior such as the bribery of a pub
lic official,95 while our private law contains other guarantees against

86. On the loss of industrial jobs and the trend to an economy based on information
technology and consumer services, see ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS:
PREPARING OURSELVES FOR 21ST-CENTURY CAPITALISM (1991).
87. On the export of manufacturing jobs, see id. at 171-84.
88. See LEMANN, supra note 81. On tests in K-12 schools, see Howard Gardner, What
Do Tests Test?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1998, at A31; Marisa Trevino, Standardized Tests Can
Be Misleading, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 24, 1999, at 6J.
89. On the attack on teachers' unions, see, e.g., Richard Lee Colvin, Selling Teachers on
School Reform, L.A. TIMES, May 6, 1999, at Al.

90. On charter and voucher plans, see Edward B. Fiske

&

Helen F. Ladd, The Invisible

Hand as Schoolmaster, AM. PROSPECT, May 22, 2000, at 19.

91. E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ, TWENTIETH CENTURY FuND WORKING GROUP ON
CAMPAIGN FIN. LITIG., BUCKLEY STOPS HERE (1998); Curtis K. Tao, Note, A Compelling
Opportunity to Rethink the Flawed Evolution of Contribution Speech, 51 RUTGERS L. REV.
1345 (1999); see also, supra notes 78, 84. On the recent reaffirmance of Buckley v. Valeo's
ruling on campaign contributions, see Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 381
(2000) (holding that Buckley "define[s] the scope of permissible state limitations" on politi
cal contributions).
92. See Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case of
the Emperor's Clothes, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1589 (1993).
93. E.g. , TRIBE supra note 72,. §§ 16-7 to -12, 16-31 at 1590-93, 16-33 at 1610-13.
94. Id. §§ 16-13 to -23.
95. E.g. , JOHN NOONAN, JR., BRIBES (1984).
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distortion in such rules as antitrust,96 corporate governance law,97 and
bankruptcy.98
Yet no comparable feature protects social mobility, the ability of
private citizens to gain an education or launch a political campaign.
Case law deems education not a fundamental right,99 poverty not a
suspect class;100 moreover, our society has rebelled, until now, at
funding independent candidates for political office.101 Our system, in
short, proceeds like a hydra-headed creature, with one head consisting
of a highly idealized system of public law; another, a less idealized pri
vate law governing the way we make profits and earn livings, but little
to mediate between the two.102 Like the patient Christina, our pri
vate/public law structure is as disconnected and stumbling as any of
Oliver Sacks's patients.103 Fish's solution - that we look to our legal
system's broad structure for guarantees against oppression - leads to
the very blind alley he describes over the course of 368 pages on the
defects of mainstream legal reasoning.
It turns out, then, that our predicament is even deeper than Fish
paints. We cannot rely on separation of powers nor on popular will to
guard against domination by our own government or by well-financed
elites. Furthermore, principle will rarely stop a determined adversary.
We are left, then, with little more than the resources we bring to any
encounter, primarily our own intuitions, growing out of our life expe
riences with justice and injustice, and what political alliances we may
make with like-minded individuals in support of common ends. For

96. E.g. , LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST §§
1-2, 5-11, 44-52 (1977) (discussing antitrust doctrines aimed at normalizing economic effi
ciency and deterring monopolies and price-fixing).
97. E.g., HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES (3d student ed. 1983) (describing policies against insider
trading), §§ 239-40, 298.
98. E.g., DAYID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY (1993) (setting out policies of this
branch of law, including providing debtors with a fresh start, and creditors an orderly and
predictable means of collecting amounts due them).
99. See San Anfonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); TRIBE, supra
note 72, § 16-4, 16-9; see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (applying intermediate stan
dard of review to Texas scheme that denied access to public education by the children of un
documented aliens); James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249 (1999)
(noting that many inner-city schools are both underfunded and segregated, and that reme
dial schools must address both conditions simultaneously).
100. E.g. , Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); TRIBE, supra note 72, § 16-52;
Randall S. Jeffrey, Equal Protection in State Courts: The New Economic Equality Rights, 17
LAW & INEQ. 239 (1999).
·
101. See supra notes 78, 84, 90 and accompanying text.
102. That is to say: That structure is not only poorly adapted to counter official oppres
sion, it is unlikely to sustain any sort of coherent social program, at least on its own. See su
pra notes 78-99 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
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Fish, as for this writer, to believe that we have more is a dangerous il
lusion, one that threatens to disconnect us, in an almost neurological
sense, from the sources of action and belief that really matter.
CONCLUSION

In the end, Fish simply wants to reveal what principles are not not so much to get us to abandon them as to alleviate some of the in
ternal anxiety that espousing them creates. If we follow his lead, we
will no longer have to feel "pithed," or disoriented, because of serious
flaws in our internal compass. We can use rhetoric to our heart's con
tent and not feel guilty or hypocritical - because there is no other
way.104
Yet, a deeper look at the structure of our legal system reveals that
our quandary is more profound than Fish exposes. A fundamental
contradiction in our system, which throws our public and private law
at odds with each other, prevents Fish's solution - to simply exploit
rhetoric (while keeping aware of its traps) and relying on our constitu
tional structure to safeguard us - from working.
In The Trouble with Principle, Stanley Fish reveals only the first
stages of an illness endemic in our legal system. Because he fails to
recognize how deep the predicament runs, he offers up a solution that
cannot be used by a society increasingly mired in self-contradiction.
Not until we open up avenues for upward mobility or reconcile the
contradiction between public and private law will we be able to orient
ourselves in any satisfactory way, or develop defenses against the
types of deep, structural inequalities that are developing at such a
frightening pace.

104. "Figure out what you think is right and then look around for ways [i.e., principles,
rhetoric] to be true to it." P. 242; see also pp. 7, 67-71, 75, 89, 91-92, 94, 126-46, 149 (same);
supra notes 15-18, 30-31, 39 (same).

